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Abstract
In this paper, we focus on a novel and potentially important aspect of the workfare policy
in the Danish labor market, namely its eﬀect on crime. We do this by exploiting two policy
changes. First, we examine the eﬀect of a series of national welfare reforms introduced during
the 1990s. Those reforms strengthened the work requirement for the young welfare recipients
and were introduced gradually, starting with younger welfare participants ﬁrst. We exploit
the diﬀerential introduction of workfare reform across diﬀerent age groups as the exogenous
variation. Second, we use a unique policy experiment that began in 1987 by an innovative
mayor of the Danish city of Farum, where he imposed a 100 % work or training requirement
for all welfare recipients immediately from the date of enrollment. By comparing the changes
in crime rates among the welfare recipients in Farum before and after 1987 with that of the
rest of Denmark, we identify the eﬀect of workfare on the crime rate.
Our results show a dramatic decline in the arrest rate among welfare recipients after the
introduction of the stronger workfare requirements, both at the national level and in Farum.
Those results imply a strong and signiﬁcant crime reducing eﬀect of the workfare policy.
11 Introduction
In many countries there has been a high level of interest on active labor market policies, i.e.,
mandatory work requirement on jobless individuals on unemployment insurance or welfare1,
as a way of helping them into employment. Some activation programs such as job placement
programs could be very eﬀective in ﬁnding jobs to workers, while other programs, such as training
programs may increase workers’ human capital or merely getting them used to a disciplined
lifestyle. The employment eﬀects of active labor market policy in Denmark is mixed at best
(see Rosholm and Svarer (2004)). This is especially true for the welfare recipients. Both Bolvig
et al. (2003) and Graversen (2004) ﬁnd that most training programs have large lock in eﬀect,
which reduces the transition out of unemployment during the program period, but only have
modest treatment eﬀect after the program period. Bolvig et al. (2003) ﬁnds a negligible lock
in eﬀect and strong treatment eﬀect for the private and public employment programs, whereas
Graversen (2004) ﬁnds that active labor market programs increase regular employment only for
the private employment programs. But he also ﬁnds that private employment programs deal
with workers that have characteristics that makes them more employable than the other welfare
recipients.
One of the reasons for the ineﬀectiveness of active labor market policy in reducing the
welfare dependency is likely the characteristics of the welfare recipients. Graversen (2004) argues
that welfare recipients in Denmark have weaker attachments to labor market than the other
workers, and are more likely to have other problems such as antisocial behavior, drinking and
drug problems. Indeed, two thirds of the welfare recipients are not included in the oﬃcial
unemployment statistics because they are not considered to be employable. This is why many
argue that active labor market policies for welfare recipients are not worth the cost, except
1From now on, we will use the terms: mandatory work requirement, workfare, activation policy, active labor
market policy, and active labor market programs to have the same meaning.
2perhaps, the private employment programs applied to the more employable welfare recipients.
However, active labor programs may not only be good for employment. Participation in
the programs may also help individuals abstain from criminal activity. If this is the case,
this should be examined carefully and be taken into consideration when active labor market
programs are designed and their cost beneﬁt analysis are made. This is especially the case
for the programs for welfare recipients because their crime rates are much higher than the
rest of the population. In fact, the social beneﬁt from crime reduction can be stronger than
the beneﬁt due to the reduction in welfare dependency. This is because crimes impose strong
negative externality to the community, and the conventional methods for reducing crimes, such
as incarceration are much more costly than the workfare policies. The cost of incarceration not
only includes its physical cost, but also dynamic costs, which are the stigma of an arrest record
and criminal human capital accumulation in prison. Bayer et al. (2008) forcefully argue that
prison environment greatly facilitates criminal human capital accumulation through learning
from the peers.
The issue is relevant not just for European countries where active labor market programs
(in shorthand, ALMPs) cover many unemployed workers and workers on welfare, but also for
countries like the U.S. that have experienced high crime rates. According to Freeman (1996), the
percentage of men incarcerated in the U.S. is roughly the same as the percentage of men in long
term unemployment in Europe. Donohue and Siegelman (1998) extensively survey evaluation
studies of U.S. social programs on whether they reduce crimes. They discuss the Job Corps
program in length because that is the program they argue has the most promise in terms of
reduction in crime. Job Corps is a residential program where economically disadvantaged youths
aged 16-21 voluntarily participate in educational and training programs for 7 months. In order
to stay in the program, one must not be arrested for felonies, pass drug tests, avoid ﬁghting,
robbery, or sexual assault of a criminal nature. One must also abide by minor rules, such as
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assigned into treatment group and control group. The program is estimated to reduce overall
crime by 12 %. In contrast to programs such as Job Corps, where participants not only self
select in to the program but also were carefully screened, the Danish ALMPs apply to anybody
whose stay on welfare has exceeded the passive period. That is, we are not evaluating a new
program or a pilot program. We are pointing out a large and positive beneﬁt that so far has been
overlooked, of a program that has been around for more than 15 years. Hence, our results would
not only help communities that already have adopted the ALMPs in better understanding their
crime reduction eﬀect, but also provide a ready to implement and well understood program as
a promising option for reducing crimes.
Participation in an ALMP may inﬂuence individuals’ risk of committing crime in various
ways. There may exist a direct eﬀect from the reduction in leisure due to work, training or
education, which may simply leave less time for crime. Jacob and Lefgren (2003) measure the
short run eﬀects of a schooling day on crime. They estimate when students are given days oﬀ
from school exogenously, they commit more property crimes and less violent crimes. What they
measure is the intensive margin of the eﬀect of schooling on crime of students who are already
enrolled to school and attend classes regularly. Those who would be the most criminally at risk
may rarely come to school, thus may only be weakly aﬀected by the policy. What we measure is
the eﬀect of an extensive margin, when a local government assigns individuals who would have
stayed home to activation programs. We show that the major part of the policy eﬀect comes
from those who depend on welfare the most, i.e. who are on welfare more than 75 % of the time.
Those are the individuals who are likely to be the most criminally active.
The extensive margin may include the eﬀect of removing individuals from a criminal lifestyle
and place them in a working lifestyle without crime. In that sense, our work is related to the large
body of empirical work that estimates the eﬀect of unemployment on crime. The existence of a
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hundred years in the social sciences literature (see Cantor and Land (1985) for details). Reviews
of the literature can be found in Wilson (1983), Long and Witte (1981), and Chiricos (1987).
According to Chiricos (1987) and Levitt (2001) there is a predominance of estimates with a
positive correlation between unemployment and property crime. For unemployment and violent
crimes, however, the connection does not seem to be equally clear.
Even though the positive correlation between unemployment and crime is well established,
estimating the causal eﬀect of unemployment to crime remains a challenge. This is because
many unobserved characteristics or events that make individuals more likely to become unem-
ployed also make them more likely to commit crime. The example could be an adverse social
event, such as membership in a gang, or family breakup. In order to identify the causal relation
from unemployment to crime, researchers try to ﬁnd exogenous variations that aﬀect unemploy-
ment but not crime directly. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) use closing of military base
as exogenous variation that aﬀects unemployment. Notice that the events such as base closing
or plant closing not only change the employment of the individuals working in the area but
also negatively aﬀect the local community, which may increase crime as well. Nilsson and Agell
(2003) estimate the eﬀect of unemployment and labor market program participation on crime
using Swedish municipality level data, where they use lagged unemployment and lagged labour
market program participation as instruments.
In this paper, we explicitly address the endogeneity issue of program participation. We do
this by exploiting two types of policy changes. First, we examine the eﬀect of a series of national
reforms on activation policy for young introduced during the 1990s. Those reforms strengthened
the work requirement for the welfare recipients and were introduced gradually, starting with
younger welfare participants ﬁrst. Hence, we exploit the diﬀerential introduction of workfare
reform across diﬀerent ages as the exogenous variation to estimate the policy eﬀect. Second, we
5analyze the eﬀect of a radical workfare policy in a municipality. In 1987 a Danish municipality
by the name Farum introduced immediate ALMP participation for all individuals who received
social beneﬁts. That is, when an individuals went to the welfare oﬃce in order to obtain beneﬁts
the person would at the same time be enrolled in a ALMP. In the rest of Denmark ALMP
participation would normally not occur until individuals had received beneﬁts continuously
between 3 months and XXX months. We use the introduction of imminent activation in Farum
as treatment and examine the causal eﬀect on crime in Farum compared to the rest of Denmark.
In the study we use Danish register data on individuals supplied by Statistics Denmark.
We have access to information on labor market status and demographics, of the entire Danish
population from 1981 to 2005. Furthermore, from the central crime register of the Danish Police,
we obtained detailed records on arrest, verdict and sentencing outcomes as well.
Our results show that in both estimation exercises using the national reform and the one
in Farum, the workfare has a statistically and economically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on crime,
which leads us to conclude that the crime reduction eﬀect of workfare programs is robust to
the environment that is implemented. It comes from the reduction of crimes by unemployment
uninsured, who were the target of the active labor market policy reforms. We also ﬁnd that the
eﬀect is not only from the increase in regular employment of the unemployment uninsured, but
the policy reduces crime also for the individuals who are uninsured and stay unemployed. That
means, active labor market programs are beneﬁcial to the society even if they do not lead to
any transition to regular employment.
Even though the two policy variations can be considered exogenous, there still remain some
sources of bias. First, since the national reforms were introduced for younger welfare recipients
ﬁrst, in later reforms for older individuals, the control group may have been treated already.
Thus, the treatment eﬀect of later reforms could have a downward bias. Since Farum’s reform
was implemented for all ages, the estimated policy eﬀect is not subject to the above dynamic
6treatment bias. Second, if we estimate the policy eﬀect only on individuals who are unemploy-
ment uninsured, i.e. potential welfare recipients, we would miss the policy eﬀect on individuals
who may avoid stricter work requirement by leaving welfare, which has been termed as “threat
eﬀect” by Black et al. (2003). This would also be a source of downward bias because those
who leave welfare to regular employment or school are likely to be less criminally active. In the
speciﬁcation where we also estimate the policy eﬀect on the sample of individuals that includes
both unemployment insured and uninsured men, the estimated overall policy eﬀect would in-
clude the threat eﬀect. However, in Farum there is another threat eﬀect: individuals can avoid
tough work requirement by leaving Farum. This is a more serious issue because we cannot a
priori determine the likely direction of bias. Therefore, in one speciﬁcation we also estimate the
location choice of Farum versus other municipalities jointly with the crime equation. But that
requires some additional exclusion restrictions. The estimation exercise using national data does
not suﬀer from such source of bias.
In Section 2, we explain the institutional details of the welfare and workfare policies in
Denmark, then the national level workfare reforms during the 1990’s and the unique welfare
policy experiment in the Danish Municipality Farum. In Section 3, we discuss the details of the
panel data we assembled from the Danish register. In Section 4, we present the empirical model
and the estimation strategy. In Section 5 we report the estimation results, and in Section 6, we
conclude.
72 Unemployment Beneﬁts, Social Assistance and Labor Market
Programs in Denmark and Farum
2.1 Unemployment Beneﬁts, Social Assistance and Labor Market Programs
in Denmark
In Denmark unemployed individuals fall into two categories: members of an unemployment
insurance fund who are entitled to unemployment beneﬁts and those who are not. The latter
individuals are entitled to social assistance (welfare).
In the beginning of the 90’s, to be able to become a member of the unemployment insurance
fund (UI fund), one has to either work for an employer, be self-employed, or participate in
a training course or higher education for at least 18 months. Then, the worker can receive
unemployment insurance payments when unemployed and actively seeking employment when
he/she has been a member of the UI fund for more than one year and has worked full time for
26 weeks (6 months) during the last 3 years. Also, individuals who had just ﬁnished education
or apprenticeship could become a member of UI fund and obtain beneﬁts after only one month
of membership and without the employment requirement. Once eligible, the workers can receive
UI beneﬁt for two and a half years of “passive period”, as long as they can claim they are
searching for a job. After that, individuals have to participate in activation programs which
provide training or government supported employment for half a year, which is called “active
period”. Before 1994, it was possible to continue receiving UI beneﬁts as long as the individual
participated in activation program after the expiry of passive periods of unemployment insurance,
up to 9 years.
After 1994, individuals who were unemployed for four years had to participate in the activa-
tion programs up to three years. Furthermore, the participation in activation programs did not
make the unemployed eligible for another rounds of UI. Gradually after 1994, the ﬁrst passive
8periods of unemployment has been shortened. In 1996, the initial passive period was further
reduced to two years, except for workers who already had UI beneﬁts or had lost the beneﬁt and
had not regained it. For them, the passive period was reduced to three years, and from 1998, it
was further reduced to two years.
The unemployed individuals who do not receive unemployment insurance beneﬁts or not
employable individulas receive social assistance (welfare) from the government. Individuals with
a personal fortune or an employed spouse can be subject to some restrictions, and potentially
not be entitled to any assistance.
The recipients of social assistance are younger, are less educated, have less work experience
and have longer unemployment periods. It is also the case that they tend to be less integrated
to the society, tend to suﬀer alcohol or drug abuse, and are subject to physical and mental
health problems. Furthermore, a relatively large fraction of the welfare beneﬁt recipients are
immigrants and refugees. More than two thirds of the welfare beneﬁt recipients are not included
in the oﬃcial unemployment statistics since they are not considered to be immediately available
for work (Graversen 2004).
Both unemployment insurance beneﬁts and social assistance are administered at the local
municipalities. For the unemployment insurance beneﬁts, the local municipalities have to follow
strictly the national unemployment insurance policy. The recipients have to report to the local
employment oﬃce, and it ensures that they are actively seeking jobs, as well as meeting the
other demands for receiving beneﬁts.
There have been a number of changes to the social assistance system both during the 1980s
and the 1990s. From the mid 1980s more and more emphasis was put on workfare (activation),
in particular for the young.
In 1990 the so called youth-beneﬁt law(“Ungdomsydelse”) was introduced for youth below
20, and in 1992 (July), it was expanded to youth below 25. According to the law, in order to
9receive the welfare beneﬁt, the young individual has to register within 2 weeks of unemployment,
and then, from day one of registration, be activated. That is, he/she would either be given a
government subsidized private employment or public relief work, or participation in a training
program. The workfare oﬀer was for a spell of 5 month, which was extended to 8 months in
1992.
In 1994, the law was amended so that for individuals who are below age 25 and on social
assistance, the mandatory activation starts after 13 weeks of unemployment, and for those older
than 25 it starts after 12 months of unemployment. From 1995, the activation requirements for
welfare recipients have been gradually strengthened. That is, in 1995 the mandatory weekly
hours of activation have increased from 20 hours to 30 hours. In 1996 the period of mandatory
activation has been extended from 6 months to 18 months, and in 1998 all individuals below the
age 30 had to be activated after 13 weeks of unemployment.
However, these reforms were not tightly enforced. The actual implementation of the ac-
tivation were left to the local municipalities, and many of them could delay the activation or
reduce them due to lack of resources. On the other hand, some municipalities implemented more
ambitious activation schemes that started earlier and lasted longer than the national guidelines.
2.2 The case of Farum
From 1987, after the appointment of Lars Bjerreg˚ ard as an employment consultant in late 1986,
the municipality of Farum made a series of radical changes to its activation policy for recipients
of social assistance. 2
The practice in Denmark until then had been to send individuals on social assistance into
activation only after a very long period of unemployment, and only if the municipality believed
that these individuals were not capable of ﬁnding work by themselves. The activation programs
2He would later in 1991 be appointed head of employment administration.
10in Farum until the end of 1986 was of similar nature and with a focus on employment/activation
in service jobs inside the municipality, shoveling of snow for the elderly, cleaning of local nature
areas etc. (Birkbak, 1997:13)
After the employment of Bjerreg˚ ard two drastic changes were made regarding social assis-
tance and activation in Farum. First, for an unemployed individual to be able to receive social
assistance, he/she had to be in some form of activation. This meant that unemployed were acti-
vated the very ﬁrst day they applied for unemployment beneﬁts at the municipality and had to
report to the ﬁrm where they were activated or to local activation facility “Produktionshuset”
(the Production House) every workday from then on – at 7.00 am. Second, the practice of
activation was changed so that unemployed individuals mainly went to work in private ﬁrms at
reduced wage instead of working for the municipality itself. If it was not possible to ﬁnd a suit-
able position in a private ﬁrm because a position was not available or the unemployed individual
did not have the necessary skills, linguistically or otherwise, from May 1987 the individual was
assigned to work at the Production House.
These policy changes were introduced over the period of late 1986 through out 1987. From
1988 individuals with physical or mental disabilities who received social assistance were also
subject to lighter forms of activation. Alcoholics, drug addicts e.g. were subjected to mandatory
treatment in order to receive beneﬁts. It is also worth noticing that Farum made no distinctions
based on age-groups, gender, education or any other demographic characteristics. (Birkbak,
1997)
In the late 1990s and early 2000s Farum relaxed their activation policies after a series of
lawsuits from Danish labour unions, complaints from the ministry of employment, and the
scandal of mayor Peter Brixtofte. In particular, there were allegations put forward by labor
unions in 2000-2001 that activated workers were used as cheap labor by ﬁrms that had political
connections to the mayor and were given contracts with the Production House. Those activities
11were alleged to violate the laws protecting the workers and give those ﬁrms unfair competitive
advantage. In 2000, 2001, Danish parliament started to discuss the matter. In 2002, after a
series of newspaper reports on those allegations, Danish minister asked mayor Brixtofte to adjust
the workfare programs to address those concerns. Furthermore, Anti-Trust Board of Denmark
formally launched an investigation into anticompetitive nature of the program. Because of all
those events, we consider 2002 to be the year when Farum’s activation experiment started to
unravel. Several years later, the activation operation at the Production House was found to be
illegal and the Production House was closed in 2006. It is interesting to see that even though
activation experiment in Farum has been under heavy criticism, Danish national government
eﬀectively followed Farum experiment so that by 1998, young welfare recipients were under
the mandated activation scheme very similar to that of Farum. Later reforms in 2002 further
increased the similarities. The diﬀerence is that the implementation of the national policy was
weaker than that of Farum.
3 Data
3.1 Danish register data
In Denmark every person is from birth or immigration given a unique personal code called a
CPR-number (Central Personal Register). This code is used every time a person is in contact
wit a public body. Information on the person obtained by the government is saved at Statistics
Denmark. All individuals are followed until they either die or emigrate. The result is extremely
detailed panel data sets with, sometimes, weekly observations of the entire Danish population
going back more than 20 years. The dataset made available to us includes data for the period
1981 to 2005 and covers the entire population in that time span. It includes information on a
large number of demographic, educational, income and labor market variables. From the police
12departments we also have information on each individual’s criminal record. All the information
is registered with very high reliability and there are no problems of attrition.
Our focus will be men in the between age 18 and 30, since this group has the highest crime
rate and crime rate is very low after the age 30. Approximately 25 % of all Danish males is
arrested before the age of 30, but very few ﬁrst-time oﬀenders are rearrested after the age of
30. At the same time, this speciﬁc age group has been the target of numerous labor market
programs since the late 1980’s.
3.2 Crime measures
We obtain information on criminal activity from the Central Crime Register. It provides data on
all arrests recorded by the Danish police. The data consists of all cases ﬁled against individuals in
the entire sample, both primary as well as secondary ones. The information includes whether the
case went to court and the subsequent verdict, including whether the charges were withdrawn or
not, and whether the case was dismissed in court or not. It also has information on incarcerations:
type and place of prison and the actual time spent in jail.
The register covers the period 1981 to 2005. Information in the register can be merged with
all the other information that we have access to through the perpetrators CPR-number. In this
paper we focus on convictions. We divide various crimes into property crimes, violent crimes and
other crimes. Other crimes include drug related crimes as well criminal activity which cannot
be classiﬁed in any of the above mentioned categories. In the following we focus on total crimes,
property crimes and violent crimes.
3.3 Descriptive statistics for Farum and the rest of Denmark
In Table 1 we show some sample statistics of the variables used in our analysis. They are
shown for the municipality of Farum, and the 5 % random sample of the rest of Denmark.
13We ﬁnd that Farum has much higher rate of unemployment insured than the rest of Denmark.
We also ﬁnd that the young men in Farum have somewhat higher arrest rate than the rest
of Denmark, and slightly lower level of education. The more pronounced diﬀerences are in
marriage rate. Young men in Farum are 30 % more likely to be married, but are more likely to
have children. Furthermore, as we can see from the ratio of Danish population and that of the
Danish or immigrants from developed countries, higher proportion of the young men in Farum
are immigrants from developing countries. Also, young men in Farum are 50 % more likely than
those of the rest of Denmark to live with parents, and slightly more likely to live in the same
municipality as their parents.
Next, we compare the sample statistics of unemployment uninsured and insured. We ﬁrst
note that the arrest rate of unemployment uninsured is more than twice as much as that of the
unemployment insured young men, both in Farum and in the rest of Denmark. Notice also that
the arrest rate of insured individuals are higher in Farum than for the rest of Denmark, but for
unemployment uninsured, the arrest rate is lower in Farum. This diﬀerence could be mainly
due to the fact that the sample period includes those where the unemployment uninsured in
Farum was under a very strict activation policy, which we argue reduced criminal activities.
Furthermore, the unemployment insured individuals are on average older, higher educated than
the unemployment uninsured individuals. In Farum, the unemployment insured are twice as
likely to be married than the unemployment uninsured, and in the rest of Denmark, they are
50 % more likely to be married than the uninsured. In Farum, the unemployment insured are
also about two and a half times as likely to have children as the uninsured and in the rest of
Denmark, the unemployment insured are twice as likely to have them as the uninsured. It is
interesting to note that in the rest of Denmark, relative size of Danish and developed country
immigrants are higher for the unemployment insured than the uninsured, but in Farum it is the
opposite. Finally, in Farum the unemployment uninsured are twice as likely to stay with parents
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with parents, but the diﬀerence is not as large as in Farum. Those diﬀerences could also explain
the diﬀerence in arrest rates between Farum and the rest of Denmark for unemployed uninsured
and insured.
Figure 1 plots the Danish national unemployment rate of men at diﬀerent ages. We can see
that young men from 18 to 29 have experienced a surge in unemployment rate from 1986 to
2001. The unemployment rate of 18, 19 years old men peak around January 1990, and then
gradually decline thereafter. The peak unemployment rate of men between ages 20 to 24 is
around January 1992, and that of men between ages 25 to 29 is around January 1994. Notice
that the peak year of unemployment for 18 to 19 years old men coincides with the year when
mandated activation policy was introduced for them. Furthermore, the peak unemployment
year for 20-24 year olds coincides with the year when the mandate was applied to them as well,
and the same for 1994 for the 25-29 year olds when they started to face mandated activation.
That is, for each age group, the period when unemployment rate starts to go down coincides
with the period when the mandated activation was introduced for them. We can see from this
that mandated activation policy looks to be very eﬀective in reducing the unemployment rate.
Figure 2 plots the ratio of men in schooling or regular jobs for diﬀerent age groups. We can
see that regardless of the age group, they all hit the bottom at year 1995. Furthermore, even
though we see a decrease in trend level of unemployment from 1987 to 2002: a 2 % decrease
for the 18-19 age group, 3 % decrease for 20-24 age group, and 2 % decrease for 25-29 age
group, we do not necessarily see a corresponding increase in the employment and schooling
ratio. That is, from 1987 to 2002, it only increased by 1% for 18-19 age group, and for 25-30 age
group it actually decreased. These two ﬁgures illustrate the recent literature that evaluates the
active labor market policies in Denmark, such as Bolvig, et al. (2003) and Graversen (2004),
where they argue that the eﬀect of activation policy in moving the welfare recipients oﬀ the
15welfare dependency is small at best. Thus, most of the reduction in unemployment rate due
to the activation policy seems to come from jobs that are part of the training program, such
as the ones that hires trainees temporarily with government subsidy in wages and public sector
employment.
On the other hand, if we look at Figure 3, where we plot the monthly property crime arrest
rates of diﬀerent age groups of Danish men who were not unemployment insured, we clearly see
the eﬀect of the three main activation reforms implemented over the 1990s.3 We can see that
from 1991 until 1993, the arrest rate of 18-19 years old men have decreased more than the ones
of other age groups. Then, from 1995 to 1998, the arrest rates of 20-24 age group went down,
whereas those of the other age groups increased. Notice that the timing of the relative decrease of
the 20-24 age group, which is 1995, does not coincide with the peak year of unemployment, 1992.
This is because the 1992 reform for the 20-24 age group was not implemented very strictly. The
subsequent decrease in unemployment is known to be rather cosmetic, mostly due to generous
application of leave schemes and early retirement. In contrast, the 1994 reform had more teeth,
and resulted in real reduction in unemployment. Thereafter, from 1999 to 2002, during the
years when the 25-29 age group were subjected to the reforms in activation, their arrest rates
dramatically decreased relative to those of other age groups.
In Figure 4, we plot the monthly violent crime arrest rates for unemployment uninsured
men who are either Danish citizens or Western immigrants. There, we see a rapid increase of
violent crimes for all age groups from 1991 until 1995. It is interesting to notice that the year
the violent crime arrest rates start to increase coincides with the year when about half of the
3Before 1990 the crime dates were not recorded. Instead, only verdict dates are available, and verdict dates
are heavily clustered around the early months of the year. Because of this, we cannot identify the exact age of
crime before 1990, and since 1990 is the start of the welfare reform for 18-19 age group, for the analysis of the
national welfare reform, we dropped any data before 1991 and only conducted the regression analysis for the
reforms targeted for 20-24 and 25-30 age groups.
16hospitals for mental illness were closed. From around 2000, the arrest rates dramatically increase
again, except for that of the 25-29 year olds. We believe that this is likely due to the general
trend of increase in the rate of reporting of violent crimes. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that most of the time series variation in violent crime arrest rates are not due to the changes in
activation policy.
In Figures 5 and 6, we plot both the property and violent crime arrest rates for unemployment
insured individuals. From both ﬁgures, we can see that the arrest rates for diﬀerent age groups
are not related to the reform dates for the unemployment uninsured of the corresponding age
groups. The decrease in arrest rate from 1992 does not seem to occur only for the 18-19 age
group, and the decreasing trend seems to be common for all age groups, until the year 2000,
when the arrest rate of 20-24 age group starts to increase. Furthermore, we also do not see
a radical change in the arrest rates after 1994, 1996 or 1998, which are the years when the
activation policy for unemployment insured has changed. This is why in this paper, we mainly
focus on the arrest rates of the unemployment uninsured.
Next, we show the time series plots of various statistics for Farum and the rest of Denmark
before, during and after the Farum policy period. In Figure 7, we plot the average jobless rates
of uninsured men in Farum and the rest of Denmark. Notice that until 1986, both of them are
very close. However, after 1987, the jobless rate of Farum continues to decline, whereas that of
the rest of Denmark sharply increases over time until 1995. From 1995, both rates decline over
time. This is mainly due to the eﬀect of the implementation of the active labor market policies
nationwide. After around 2000, the gap of jobless rates between them is much smaller than
before, which we believe is mainly due to the convergence of the activation policies of Farum
and the rest of Denmark. During the 90’s Danish government made a series of reforms where
it implemented Farum style tough activation policies, where uninsured workers have to attend
training/job placement programs after the expiration of the initial grace period, which has been
17steadily shortened. In 2002, the national activation policy became almost the same as the one in
Farum, except for the stricter implementation in Farum. Notice also that the unemployment rate
of unemployment uninsured in Farum was still exceptionally low even after 2002, the years when
the Farum activation policy started to unravel. This is because the unemployment statistics does
not include those on welfare who are deemed not employable. During the periods of very low
aggregate unemployment rate for unemployment uninsured, the unemployment rate could vary
primarily because of the diﬀerences in who among the welfare recipients the municipality would
classify as employable. The national activation reforms targeting the unemployable only started
much later, around 2004.
In Figure 8 we plot the unemployment rate of unemployment insured men in both Farum and
the rest of Denmark. We can see that in contrast to the unemployment rates of unemployment
uninsured, they resemble each other very closely. Hence, it is unlikely that Farum had a large
labor market shock that aﬀected the unemployment insured workers diﬀerently than those of
the rest of Denmark, especially that the unemployment insurance policy is administered at the
national level and thus they aﬀect Farum and the rest of Denmark similarly. One possibility
that labor market shock could aﬀect diﬀerently for unemployment insured and uninsured would
be that during the policy period the composition of the unemployment uninsured in Farum has
dramatically diverged from the rest of Denmark, hence their labor supply behavior may have
changed, or labor demand shock could have aﬀected the unemployment uninsured in Farum
diﬀerently from the rest of Denmark. For example, the ratio of nonwestern immigrants has
changed diﬀerently in Farum than the rest of Denmark during the policy period, and because
they are more likely to be unemployment uninsured, that could partially explain the divergence
in jobless rate in Farum. To take that into account, we carefully control for the observed
characteristics, and also use ﬁxed eﬀects estimation when we econometrically evaluate the policy
eﬀect.
18Our measure of criminal activity is the arrests, which led to a verdict in court. From now we
will call them simply arrests. We also call the average number of arrests for a group simply the
arrest rate for the group. In Figure 9, we plot the arrest rates for unemployment uninsured men.
As we can see, the arrest rates for uninsured young men do not diﬀer between Farum and the
rest of Denmark until 1987. Thereafter, we see the arrest rates of the rest of Denmark starting
to increase, whereas the ones for Farum staying constant. The gap between Farum and the rest
of Denmark lasts until around 1998, when the arrest rate of the rest of Denmark starts to drop
to the level of Farum. We can see the same pattern in Figure 10, where we plot the arrest rates
of Farum and the rest of Denmark for property crimes. If we look at Figure 11, where we plot
the arrest rates of violent crimes, although the time series patterns are similar for Farum and
the rest of Denmark, we still perceive a slight tendency for the crime rate to from 1989 to 1997,
indicating some policy eﬀect.
In Figures 12, we plot the arrest rate of unemployment insured men in Farum and the rest
of Denmark, and in Figures 13 and 14, we plot the arrest rates for the same people for property
and violent crimes, respectively. Here, we do not see any large discrepancies between the arrest
rates of Farum and the rest of Denmark until 1998, and the increase in the arrest rate in Farum
is only due to the dramatic increase in the violent crime arrest rates in Farum after 1998, where
property crime arrest rates are close to those of the rest of Denmark.
The divergence of jobless rate and the verdict rate between Farum and the rest of Denmark
is only occurring for the uninsured. It is important to remember that in Farum the aggressive
activation policy was only instituted for the uninsured. The policies against insured were very
similar to the ones of the rest of Denmark. This leads us to suspect that the relative decline
in verdict rates of the uninsured men in Farum from around 1987 is primarily caused by the
decline in jobless rates induced by the aggressive activation policies.
The other reasons could be due to the diﬀerences in observed characteristics of the unem-
19ployment uninsured in Farum and the rest of Denmark. In Figures 15 and 16, we plot what
we believe would be the most likely candidates for the source of the reduction of the relative
arrest rates in Farum during the policy period, i.e. the ratio of nonwestern immigrants who are
unemployment uninsured, and the average years of schooling of the unemployment uninsured,
subsequently, for both Farum and the rest of Denmark. As we can see, during the policy period,
the ratio of nonwestern immigrants have declined somewhat relative to that of the rest of Den-
mark. Similarly for the average years of schooling. Hence, in order to assess the policy eﬀect,
those variables need to be controlled for in the econometric analysis we conduct later.
4 Empirical model
To estimate the eﬀect of changes in national workfare policy, we use the following linear Diﬀerence-
in-Diﬀerences model.
















where Cit is the number of verdicts of individual i in month t, Xit are variables representing
individual’s socio-economic backgrounds, such as whether he received higher education or not,
whether he is married or not, whether he has children or not, etc. Ia,it is the age dummy. That
is, Ia,it = 1 if the individual i at month t is a years old and 0 otherwise. Similarly, It is the time
dummy, which equals 1 in year t and 0 otherwise. The parameter δ1 estimates the policy eﬀect
of 1994 reform for age group 20-24, and δ2 the policy eﬀect of 1998 reform for age group 25-29.
We also estimate the above equation using ﬁxed eﬀects regression. Next, we use the following
20linear Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences model to evaluate the policy experiment in Farum.






Itγt + IF,itγF + IF,it × IPtδ + εit
where IF,it is the Farum dummy, which equals 1 if individual i lives in Farum at month t and
0 otherwise, IPt is the policy dummy which equals to 1 if the time period t belongs to the
period when active welfare policy is conducted in Farum, and 0 otherwise. Here, we adopt
the Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences estimation strategy, where the policy eﬀect is identiﬁed by the
parameter δ. The OLS estimator of δ then will be unbiased if εit is orthogonal to IF,it × IPt.
There could be two sources of bias. First, the policy eﬀect for the unemployment uninsured
could be entirely due to the fact that unemployment uninsured change their status from unin-
sured to insured during the policy period to avoid the possibility of activation. To deal with
the issue, in the econometric analysis we ﬁrst evaluate the policy eﬀect on the entire population
of men aged 18 to 30, both unemployment insured and uninsured, in Farum versus in the rest
of Denmark. The estimated overall policy eﬀect on both uninsured and insured would not be
subject to the bias due to endogeneity of insurance choice. Second, it could be that individuals
who are more criminally inclined left Farum during the policy period, which could have been
the reason of the reduction in arrests in Farum during the policy period. To deal with this, we
ﬁrst estimate the Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences with ﬁxed eﬀects. That is, we add ﬁxed eﬀects to the
above equation as follows.






Itγt + IF,itγF + IF,it × IPtδ + αi + εit
The OLS estimator then will be unbiased if
E [εit|IPt = 1,IF,it = 1,X] − E [εit|IPt = 0,IF,it = 1,X]
−{E [εkt|IPt = 1,IF,kt = 0,X] − E [εkt|IPt = 0,IF,kt = 0,X]} = 0
and biased downwards if LHS is negative, which could occur if people who left Farum during
21the policy period commit more crimes even after controling for Farum and time dummies.
We use Heckman Sample Selection procedure to formally deal with the selection issue. That
is, for the treatment sample, we run the following ﬁrst stage probit.
Pr(IFit = 1|Zit) = Φ(θZit)
where Zit includes constant term, Xit, age and time dummies and a dummy indicating whether













, λ2 (Zit) =
φ(θZit)
1 − Φ(θZit)
are the inverse Mill’s ratios, used to correct for the endogeneity due to selection. The exclusion
restriction is that whether both parents live in Farum or not aﬀects the decision of individuals
whether or not to live in Farum but not whether the individual commits a crime or not in
Farum. This could be violated if the children with a positive utility shock of committing a crime
leave Farum to avoid activation and parents follow. Another possibility would be when parents
of children on social assistance themselves are in social assistance and leave Farum to avoid
activation. To minimize bias due to those possibilities, we only choose children whose parents
are unemployment insured. We believe that those parents have been working in a regular job
most of the time, which makes it more likely that their location choices primarily depend on the
job requirement and not based on the location of their children. Another possibility that parental
location could aﬀect criminal behavior of children is that children may reduce crime when they
are living with parents. To control for the bias, we include in the RHS of the second stage
regression equation dummies indicating whether children are living with parents, and whether
they are living in the same municipality as parents.
225 Estimation Results
5.1 Results Based on National Reforms
In Table 2 columns 2 and 3, we present the OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects results where the sample
includes monthly data from 1991 to 2003 on all unemployment uninsured men in Denmark of
ages 18 to 29, who are not immigrants from nonwestern countries. In those regressions, ages and
time periods are controlled for by age and time dummies, but to save space, we do not report
their parameter estimates. In the second column, we report the OLS results. Notice that overall
education is negatively related with crime, even though the coeﬃcient on the higher education
dummy is estimated to be positive and signiﬁcant, because of the negative and signiﬁcant years
of schooling coeﬃcient. Being married and having children are negatively related to crime as
well. The eﬀect of both reforms, targeting youth aged 20-24 and aged 25-29, on crime are
estimated to be negative and signiﬁcant.
We report the ﬁxed eﬀects results in the third column. It is intriguing to see the coeﬃcients
on years of schooling, on higher education dummy to be positive and signiﬁcant at 5% level.
This is likely due to the potential heterogeneity in crime dynamics. In estimating the dynamic
model of crime on data on young men in Philadelphia, Imai and Krishna (2004) found two types:
the criminal and noncriminal types. For both types the arrest rate declines after the age of 18,
but it is the criminal type that has the steeper decline after the age 18. In Denmark, the peak of
arrest is around age 20. If, similarly in Denmark, the decline in arrest afterwards is steeper for
the criminals, who are likely to have lower schooling, then the ﬁxed eﬀect estimate would result
in positive schooling eﬀects. We believe that the marriage coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant
for similar reasons. The ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for the policy eﬀects are estimated to be smaller
than the OLS results. The policy eﬀect for reforms targeting 20-24 year olds is estimated to
reduce annual crimes by 0.008, which is still economically signiﬁcant, given the average arrest
23rate for 18-29 age group to be 0.11. On the other hand, the policy eﬀect for the age group 25-29
is eﬀectively zero.
In the fourth and ﬁfth columns, we present results for the unemployment insured young
men. The OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcients are similar in signs as those for the unemployment
uninsured. In the OLS, policy eﬀect for 25-29 year olds is estimated to be small but negative and
signiﬁcant, but none of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of the policy eﬀects are estimated to be nega-
tive. From those results, we can conclude that there is some policy eﬀect for the unemployment
uninsured but not for the insured.
There are several caveats to the above results. First, OLS, by comparing the crime rate
of older individuals to younger individuals, cannot separate the cohort eﬀects and the reform
eﬀects. That is, the earlier cohort, who will be old enough for the reforms targeting 20-24 and
25-29 olds may have lower crimes than the later and younger cohorts because they have received
in the past treatment targeting 18-19 year olds. Hence, OLS estimates of the policy eﬀect of older
individuals may overstate the eﬀect. Second, since the 20-24 year olds receiving their treatment
period may have already experienced treatment, the treatment eﬀect on them estimated from the
ﬁxed eﬀect could only reﬂect the marginal eﬀect of additional treatment. Then, it is reasonable
to infer that the ﬁxed eﬀects understates the policy eﬀect for older individuals. This is consistent
with what we ﬁnd in our estimation exercise: policy eﬀects obtained by OLS are higher than
those obtained by Fixed eﬀects.
5.2 Results Based on the Reform in Farum
Next, we present the estimation results where we use the radical activation reform introduced
in Farum in 1987 as the exogenous variation. Since from the beginning the policy applied to
anybody regardless of age or gender, the estimation results from the policy experiment are
much less subject to the cohort eﬀect bias we discussed above. As we discussed earlier, we ﬁrst
24report the estimates of the overall policy eﬀect for both unemployment uninsured and insured.
The overall policy eﬀect includes the change in arrest rate due to the switch in unemployment
insurance status.
We ﬁrst divide the policy periods into three periods, with each period being 4 or 5 years of
length. That is, the ﬁrst period is from 1987 to 1991, the second from 1992 to 1997, and the
third from 1998 to 2001. In column 1, we can see that men with more years of schooling, men
that have more than highschool degree in education, married men and men with children have
less arrest records. All of them are estimated to be signiﬁcant at 5% level. Both for the ﬁrst and
second policy periods, the interaction term between Farum and time dummy are negative and
signiﬁcant at 5% signiﬁcance level. For the third policy period, the coeﬃcient is positive but
insigniﬁcant. This could be due to the convergence of activation policies of Farum and the rest
of Denmark from late 1990’s. As we discussed earlier, during the late 1990’s Farum’s activation
policy was under critical scrutiny, while rest of Denmark eﬀectively followed Farum’s emphasis
of activation policy for social assistance program participants. To take that into account, we
consider two policy period, one that starts in 1987 and ends in 2001, before the start of the
formal investigation of Farum and, and the other that starts in 1987 and ends in 1997, before
1998 when, at the national level all unemployment uninsured individuals before the age 18 had
to be activated after 13 weeks of unemployment. In column 2, we present the results where we
estimate the diﬀerence of crime rates between Farum and the rest of Denmark over the entire
policy period, which we deﬁne to be from 1987 to 2001. In column 3, we deﬁne the policy period
to be from 1987 to 1997. We can see that in both cases the estimated policy eﬀect is negative
and signiﬁcant.
In Table 5, column 2 (FE1) we present the results for ﬁxed eﬀects estimation for the 1987−
2001 policy period and in column 3 (FE2) we present the one with the 1987−1997 policy period.
Regardless of whether the policy period is set to be from 1987 to 2001 or 1987 to 1997, the policy
25eﬀect is estimated to be negative and signiﬁcant at 5% level. The magnitude is estimated to be
sizeable: -0.0158 for the longer policy period and -0.0181 for the shorter policy period, given that
the average arrest rate of Farum during the sample period for both unemployment uninsured
and insured men is 0.0720.
One potential source of bias would arise, when during the policy periods uninsured unem-
ployed individuals or individuals who potential would become uninsured would leave Farum or
stay out of Farum to avoid activation. Here, we cannot a priori assess whether individuals who
leave or stay out of Farum would be more criminally active or not. In Table 5, columns 4 (FE3)
and 5 (FE4), we report the results of the Fixed Eﬀects estimates where we also include dummies
which equal to one for individuals who left Farum before, during or after the policy period.
Even though all coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant, we can see that individuals who left Farum before
the policy period are committing relatively more crimes outside Farum than the ones who did
during or after the policy period. This does not support the story that during the policy period
individuals who would commit crimes would do so when they live outside Farum so that they
would not lose their jobs and be activated. But one could also argue that individuals who left
Farum before the policy period were the ones who tried to avoid immediate activation. Hence,
those ﬁxed eﬀects regressions do not give us clear answers about the bias corrected policy eﬀect.
In Tables 6, 7 and 8, we report results of the Heckman’s two step estimation. In the second
column of Table 6 (Step 1), we present the parameter estimates of the ﬁrst stage Probit model.
Both the dummies indicating whether both parents lived in Farum or whether both parents lived
outside Farum are highly signiﬁcant in explaining the individual’s choice of whether to live in
Farum or not, with parents living outside Farum having a negative eﬀect on residence in Farum
and vice versa. That is, instruments are highly signiﬁcant in explaining the Farum dummy. In
the Second Step ﬁxed eﬀects regression, the inverse Mill’s ratio term, representing the selection
bias for the arrest rate in Farum is negative and signiﬁcant, and that for the arrest rate in
26rest of Denmark is positive and signiﬁcant. That is, the error term of the probit equation and
the second stage ﬁxed eﬀect equation for Farum is negatively correlated, implying downward
bias of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation. This corresponds to the estimated policy eﬀect coeﬃcient
of −0.0120 for the longer policy period, being smaller in value to the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator
presented in Table 5 (-0.0158). However, for the shorter policy period the eﬀect is estimated to
be −0.0209, whose value is larger than that of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator in Table 5 (−0.0181).
That is, the direction of bias for the policy eﬀect is unclear. On the other hand, the Farum
dummy for all speciﬁcation is estimated to be around 0.25, much larger than the values in Table
5, which range from 0.015 to 0.02. This implies that the selection bias was mainly on the Farum
dummy, not on the policy eﬀect. Note that the eﬀect of living together with parents, presented
in Columns 2 (FE1) and 4 (FE2) is negative and signiﬁcant, whereas the eﬀect of living in the
same municipalities with parents presented in columns 3 (FE2) and 5 (FE4) is insigniﬁcant. In
Table 7 columns 3 (FE2)and 5 (FE4) we then present the second stage results where we also
include interaction term with age dummies and the cohabitation dummy. There, the baseline
age group is 18 to 19 year olds. We can see that the negative cohabitation eﬀect is primarily on
the younger individuals, as the sum of age speciﬁc dummy coeﬃcient and the baseline coeﬃcient
becomes negative but small after the age 19. This may not just reﬂect the direct eﬀect of current
cohabitation on current criminal activity, but also that individuals who were cohabiting with
parents around age 18 to 21 were more likely to have cohabited with parents when they were
younger, and it is the cohabitation at younger ages that are important in reducing crime. Since
we only have very small sample size on individuals at ages younger than 18, we cannot separately
identify the two eﬀects. Similar results also hold when we set the policy period to be from 1987
to 1997. On the other hand, living with parents in the same municipality at age 18-19 has a
positive eﬀect on crime, but afterwards, the eﬀect becomes close to zero.
The reduction of arrests for the young men during the policy period could be due to the
27changes in Farum that is unrelated to the activation policy. Those could be, for example, an
increase in police spending in Farum, or an increase in municipal spending on youth activities.
To consider the possibility, we next run separate regressions for the unemployment uninsured
and insured. If, during the policy period, crimes decreased for the unemployment uninsured but
not for the unemployment insured, then we can rule out the eﬀect of policies that aﬀect both
unemployment insured and uninsured. Table 9 reports the OLS results for the crime equation
for uninsured and insured individuals separately. We can see that higher level of education
decreases crime (the coeﬃcient of high education dummy is positive and signiﬁcant for the
uninsured workers, but not large enough to oﬀset the negative years of schooling eﬀect), and so
are the eﬀects of marriage, children, for both unemployment uninsured and insured. Being either
Danish or an immigrant from developed countries reduces crime and being in Farum increases
crime, but those eﬀects are not signiﬁcant, except for the Danish or immigrant from developed
countries dummy for the unemployment insured in OLS3 and OLS4 and for the Farum dummy
in OLS4. The policy eﬀect is negative and signiﬁcant for the unemployment uninsured at 5% but
insigniﬁcant and small for the unemployment insured. The policy eﬀect for the unemployment
uninsured is quite sizeable, 0.0345 for 1987−2001 policy period and 0.0404 for the 1987−1997,
given that the average arrest rate of unemployment uninsured in Farum is 0.1029. In Table 10, we
report the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates. Notice that the parameter estimates of the eﬀect of schooling
are positive, and signiﬁcant for the higher education dummy for the unemployment uninsured.
Our explanation for the nonnegative schooling eﬀect is similar to the one discussed when we
reported the results for both the insured and uninsured. That is, after the peak age of crime, it
is the criminal type that reduced crime rates more, and thus individuals with higher schooling,
who are more likely to be noncriminal type, would reduce the arrest rates less, resulting in the
nonnegative schooling coeﬃcient for the unemployment uninsured. Similar discussions also hold
for the coeﬃcient estimates for the marriage dummy, which are also positive and insigniﬁcant.
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for the unemployment insured. The policy eﬀect has negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the
unemployment uninsured but positive and insigniﬁcant for the insured. That is, the negative
policy eﬀect seems to primarily come from the unemployment uninsured. Again, the magnitude
of the policy eﬀect is sizeable, 0.0447 for 1987−2001 policy period and 0.509 for the 1987−1997,
which is about half of the average arrest rate of unemployment uninsured in Farum.
As we mentioned earlier, policies on the unemployment insured individuals are administered
at the central government and do not have much local variation. The fact that OLS results
and the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation results show no policy eﬀects on the insured is reassuring for
the validity of our empirical analysis, since it excludes any possibility of exogenous changes
in Farum that had a strong eﬀect on criminal behavior for both unemployment insured and
uninsured during the policy period.
Now, there could be two types endogeneities that could bias the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation of
the policy eﬀect. First, in order to avoid activation when unemployed during the policy periods,
individuals could seek jobs that provide unemployment insurance. In Figure 17 we plot the
ratio of individuals who are insured for Farum and for the rest of Denmark. We can see that
the young men in Farum are less unemployment insured in Farum than the rest of Denmark,
and the diﬀerence has been slowly increasing over time until 1990, from 0.130 in 1986 to 0.172
in 1990. After that, it has decreased until 1995 to 0.075, whereafter it has been increasing.
Hence, if we just look at Figure 17, the sign of the eﬀect of workfare policy on insurance choice
of workers in Farum relative to the rest of Denmark is ambiguous. In Table 11, we report the
results of the probit analysis, which estimates the probability of unemployment insurance choice.
There, after controlling for the observables, during policy period the unemployment insurance
probability is estimated to be higher, and it is signiﬁcant at 5% level. Since the individuals
who can ﬁnd insured jobs are those who are less criminally active, the selection due to the
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the crime rates of the uninsured. Therefore, the resulting selection of insurance choice would
bias the policy parameters upwards. Hence the negative policy eﬀect we obtain is likely to
be a conservative estimate. On the other hand, the individuals who, during the policy period
switched their status from uninsurance to insurance may be more likely to commit crimes, thus
increasing the arrest rate for the unemployment insured during the policy period, which could
be the reason for the slightly positive albeit insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on the policy dummy. If
we take the weighted sum of the policy eﬀect for unemployment uninsured and insured, with
weights being the unemployment uninsurance and insurance rates, then for the longer policy
period the sum is −0.0169, which is very close to the overall policy eﬀect estimate of −0.0158
and for the long policy period, the sum is −0.0210, which is also fairly close to the overall policy
eﬀect estimate of −0.0181.
In Tables 12, 13 and 14, we report results of the Heckman’s two step estimation for the
unemployment uninsured. In the ﬁrst column of the table, we present the parameter estimates
of the ﬁrst stage Probit model. Both the dummies indicating whether both parents lived in
Farum or whether both parents lived outside Farum are highly signiﬁcant in explaining the
individual’s choice of whether to live in Farum or not, with parents living outside Farum having
a negative eﬀect on residence in Farum and vice versa. That is, instruments are highly signiﬁcant
in explaining the Farum dummy. In the Second Step ﬁxed eﬀects regression, the results are very
similar to the ones obtained using both unemployment insured and uninsured individuals. The
inverse Mill’s ratio terms, representing the selection bias are signiﬁcant and the policy eﬀects
are negative and highly signiﬁcant, and the eﬀects are larger than the ones obtained when both
uninsured and insured samples were used. The policy eﬀect again is estimated to be large,
around −0.04 for the long policy period and −0.055 for the short policy period. The Heckman 2
step estimation results conﬁrm that it is the reduction of arrests of the unemployment uninsured
30that is the main part of the policy eﬀect.
5.3 Direct and Indirect Eﬀects of Activation
So far, we have obtained results that indicate that active labor market policies for welfare
participants are eﬀective in reducing their crime rate. The next issue we try to address is why it
does so. We consider two potential reasons for it. First, activation could induce unemployment
uninsured welfare recipients into employment, and the transition from unemployment or out of
labor force to employment reduces crime. This would be an indirect eﬀect of activation. There
is a sizeable literature documenting that employment decreases crime. Examples are Raphael
and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and others. Another eﬀect would be when activation reduces crimes
of individuals who stay on welfare and do not become formally employed. That would be a
direct eﬀect, which, to the best of our knowledge , has not been formally investigated. In Table
15, column 3 (FE1) we report ﬁxed eﬀects results, separately for uninsured individuals who were
on welfare more than 25 % of the days in a year, and less than or equal to 25 % of the days
in a year. Similarly, column 4 (FE2) shows the results for 50 % and column 5 (FE3) for 75
%. As we can see, the policy eﬀects for the welfare dependents are estimated to be extremely
large, and it increases with the magnitude of the dependency: from -0.23, -0.18 for the men
who were on welfare more than 25 % of the time to -0.37, -0.36 for those who were on welfare
more than 75 % of the time. The decrease in arrest rate is even higher than the overall arrest
rate of the unemployment uninsured, which is around 0.10 for Farum and 0.11 for the rest of
Denmark. This comes from the fact that the welfare dependents are the ones whose arrest rates
are in the are relatively high even among the unemployment uninsured men. On the other hand,
if we look at the results for men who have been on welfare less than or equal to 25 % of the
days in a year, the policy eﬀects are estimated to be insigniﬁcant, and similarly for the men
who have been on welfare less than or equal to 50 %, and 75 %. There is a slight tendency for
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tentatively conclude that the negative eﬀect of activation for the uninsured young men on crime
not only comes from the increase in employment, but also from the reduction in crime for the
activated but not employed. That is, the activation policy has strong negative impact on crime
for those individuals for whom the activation program is considered to have no employment
eﬀect, because they are ”locked in” in the program. And it seems that those are the individuals
who are most active criminally. Thus, our results provide support for the labor market programs
for the long term welfare participants. By reaching out to individuals with very low chances of
regular employment, active labor market program could still improve the local community by
reducing the criminal activities of those who are the most at risk of committing crimes.
5.4 Robustness Checks
So far, for the results involving the Farum experiments, we have presented mostly OLS and IV
results. Since number of arrests per year is discrete, those methods in principle are not appro-
priate. Hence, in this section, we report the results where we have used Count data methods,
i.e. negative binomial regressions and conditional ﬁxed eﬀects negative binomial regressions. We
only report the policy eﬀect estimates, which are summarized in Table 16. In Column 2 (UI &
SA), we report policy eﬀect estimates for both unemployment insured and uninsured. We can
see that all the estimates are consistent with those of the OLS and Fixed eﬀects estimates in
sign and signiﬁcance. They are all negative and signiﬁcant except for the OLS estimate with
policy period of 1998 to 2001. Similarly, the policy eﬀect estimates for the welfare recipients
presented in column 3 (SA) are also consistent with the OLS and FE results before. All of the
policy eﬀects are estimated to be negative and signiﬁcant, with their eﬀects to be larger than
those of the unemployment uninsured and insured. In column 4 (UI), we report the estimated
policy eﬀects of the unemployment insured. There, just like the ones obtained earlier using the
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results of the policy eﬀects are robust to the speciﬁcation of the functional form used in the
estimation.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have estimated the eﬀect of workfare policy of the young male workers, both unemployment
uninsured and insured, on crime. We exploited two policy changes. First, we examine the eﬀect
of a series of national welfare reforms introduced during the 1990s. Those reforms strengthened
the work requirement for the young welfare recipients and were introduced gradually, starting
with younger welfare participants ﬁrst. The diﬀerential introduction of workfare reform across
diﬀerent age groups work as the exogenous policy variation. Second, we use a unique policy
experiment that began in 1987 in Farum, where a 100 % work or training requirement was
imposed for all welfare recipients immediately from the date of enrollment. By comparing the
changes in crime rates among the welfare recipients in Farum before and after 1987 with that
of the rest of Denmark, we identify the eﬀect of workfare on the crime rate. We ﬁnd the crime
reduction eﬀect to be both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. We also ﬁnd that the
eﬀect comes both from the increased employment and from a decrease in criminal activities by
individuals that still remain unemployed and on welfare.
Nowadays in Denmark and many other countries in Europe, activation policies cover most
workers in the labor force when they are unemployed. Hence, it is fair to say that they aﬀect a
large fraction of the population. However, research on those policies have been almost exclusively
focused on their eﬀect on employment. We believe that it is important that we also take a careful
look at other aspects of activation policies that could be of importance for the general public.
For example, recently much active research has been done on the “threat eﬀect” of the programs
33(Black et. al. 2003). That is, there are results that the fear of future activation is what drives
people to employment. However, fear of activation or the stress of actually going through the
activation program could induce individuals to commit more crimes. Then, activation programs
that carry less sticks and are less targeted towards immediate employment could be more eﬀective
in reducing crimes of the welfare recipients, and given suﬃciently strong crime reduction eﬀects,
those programs could be a better choice for the general public. Those are the issues that we
believe are left for future research.
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37Table 1: Sample Statistics
Total Unemployment Uninsured Unemployment Insured
Farum Rest of Denmark Farum Rest of Denmark Farum Rest of Denmark
variable mean std. dev mean std. dev mean std. dev mean std. dev mean std. dev mean std. dev
Unemployment Uninsured 0.4425 0.4967 0.3419 0.4743
Arrest Rate 0.0720 0.3594 0.0636 0.3393 0.1029 0.4346 0.1113 0.4755 0.0475 0.2836 0.03886 0.2360
Age 24.63 3.611 25.06 3.390 23.40 3.700 24.05 3.658 25.60 3.222 25.58 3.116
Years of Schooling 10.97 2.517 11.12 2.328 10.58 2.272 10.62 2.312 11.29 2.654 11.38 2.295
Higher Education 0.4508 0.4976 0.5154 0.4998 0.2740 0.4460 0.3218 0.4672 0.6159 0.4864 0.5912 0.4916
Married 0.2423 0.4285 0.1873 0.3901 0.1508 0.3578 0.1435 0.3506 0.3150 0.4646 0.2100 0.4073
Having children 0.2292 0.4203 0.2027 0.4020 0.1370 0.3438 0.1292 0.3355 0.3024 0.4593 0.2408 0.4276
Danish Citizen 0.8289 0.3766 0.9333 0.2495 0.8539 0.3533 0.8975 0.3034 0.8091 0.3930 0.9519 0.2140
Develped or Danish 0.8437 0.3632 0.9476 0.2229 0.8746 0.3312 0.9216 0.2688 0.8191 0.3849 0.9611 0.1934
Parents in the same home 0.3112 0.4630 0.2004 0.4003 0.4233 0.4941 0.2568 0.4368 0.2222 0.4158 0.1712 0.3767
Parents in the same municipality 0.5113 0.4999 0.4827 0.4997 0.6006 0.4898 0.4616 0.4985 0.4403 0.4964 0.4937 0.5000
Sample Size 22980 116454 10169 39812 12811 76642
3
8Table 2: Regression with National Data
Unemployment Uninsured Unemployment Insured
OLS FE OLS FE
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests
Yrs. of Schooling −0.00283 (0.00003∗∗) 0.00030 (0.00008∗∗) −0.00072 (0.00001∗∗) 0.00008 (0.00007 )
Higher Education 0.00068 (0.00010∗∗) 0.00292 (0.00029∗∗) −0.00019 (0.00005∗∗) 0.00014 (0.00024 )
Married −0.00173 (0.00018∗∗) 0.00125 (0.00020∗∗) −0.00057 (0.00005∗∗) 0.00048 (0.00009∗∗)
Children −0.00223 (0.00014∗∗) −0.00044 (0.00016∗∗) −0.00076 (0.00005∗∗) −0.00029 (0.00007∗∗)
Policy20∼24 −0.00124 (0.00023∗∗) −0.00070 (0.00018∗∗) 0.00009 (0.00008 ) 0.00008 (0.00010 )
Policy25∼29 −0.00068 (0.00021∗∗) 0.0000 (0.0002 ) −0.00019 (0.00008∗∗) 0.00037 (0.00011∗∗)
R squares 0.0044 0.0013
Sample Size 14392532 14392532 10461594 10461594
Note:
Policy20∼24 ≡ I {age ∈ {20,...,24}} × {t ≥ 1994}, Policy25∼29 ≡ I {age ∈ {25,...,29}} × {t ≥ 1998}
Standard errors are in parentheses.
39Table 3: Count Data Regression with National Data
Unemployment Uninsured Unemployment Insured
OLS FE OLS FE
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests
Yrs. of Schooling −0.3556 (0.0044∗∗) −0.1133 (0.0453∗∗) −0.00072 (0.00001∗∗) 0.00008 (0.00007 )
Higher Education −0.1133 (0.0453∗∗) 0.4019 (0.1588∗∗) −0.00019 (0.00005∗∗) 0.00014 (0.00024 )
Married −0.3835 (0.0501∗∗) 0.0029 (0.0466 ) −0.00057 (0.00005∗∗) 0.00048 (0.00009∗∗)
Children −0.1946 (0.0346∗∗) −0.0982 (0.0312∗∗) −0.00076 (0.00005∗∗) −0.00029 (0.00007∗∗)
Policy20∼24 −0.1153 (0.0417∗∗) −0.0682 (0.0350∗ ) 0.00009 (0.00008 ) 0.00008 (0.00010 )
Policy25∼29 −0.0874 (0.0451∗ ) −0.0018 (0.0391 ) −0.00019 (0.00008∗∗) 0.00037 (0.00011∗∗)
No. of Observations 4886485 808493 10461594 10461594
Note:
Policy20∼24 ≡ I {age ∈ {20,...,24}} × {t ≥ 1994}, Policy25∼29 ≡ I {age ∈ {25,...,29}} × {t ≥ 1998}
Standard errors are in parentheses.
40Table 4: OLS
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests
Yrs. of Schooling −0.0193 (0.0005∗∗) −0.0193 (0.0005∗∗) −0.0193 (0.0005∗∗)
Higher Education −0.0021 (0.0020 ) −0.0022 (0.0020 ) −0.0021 (0.0020 )
Married −0.0216 (0.0022∗∗) −0.0216 (0.0022∗∗) −0.0216 (0.0022∗∗)
Children −0.0253 (0.0020∗∗) −0.0252 (0.0020∗∗) −0.0253 (0.0020∗∗)
Developed −0.0272 (0.0053∗∗) −0.0275 (0.0053∗∗) −0.0272 (0.0053∗∗)
Farum 0.0136 (0.0043∗∗) 0.0136 (0.0043∗∗) 0.0140 (0.0037∗∗)
[87 − 91] × Farum −0.0201 (0.0069∗∗)
[92 − 97] × Farum −0.0227 (0.0062∗∗)
[98 − 01] × Farum 0.0017 (0.0083 )
[87 − 01] × Farum −0.0165 (0.0053∗∗)
[87 − 97] × Farum −0.0219 (0.0050∗∗)
R Squares 0.0271 0.0271 0.0271
Sample Size 148044 148044 148044
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
41Table 5: Fixed Eﬀects
FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests
Yrs. of Schooling 0.0011 (0.0021 ) 0.0011 (0.0021 ) 0.0011 (0.0021 ) 0.0011 (0.0021 )






∗ ) 0.0068 (0.0035
∗ ) 0.0068 (0.0035
∗ ) 0.0067 (0.0035
∗ )
Children −0.0053 (0.0031
∗ ) −0.0053 (0.0031
∗ ) −0.0053 (0.0031







[87 − 01] × Farum −0.0158 (0.0054
∗∗) −0.0191 (0.0059
∗∗)
[87 − 97] × Farum −0.0181 (0.0052
∗∗) −0.0216 (0.0055
∗∗)
[80 − 86] × moveout 0.0149 (0.0081
∗ ) 0.0139 (0.0079
∗ )
[87 − 01] × moveout 0.0005 (0.0058 )
[02 − 05] × moveout 0.0034 (0.0176 )
[87 − 97] × moveout −0.0016 (0.0061 )
[98 − 05] × moveout −0.0107 (0.0113 )
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is 148044
42Table 6: Heckman 2 Step Estimation
Step 1
Dependent Variable Farum
Yrs. of Schooling −0.0390 (0.0052
∗∗)






Parents outside Farum −0.3978 (0.0248
∗∗)
Parents in Farum 0.5140 (0.0325
∗∗)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is
61108.
Table 7: Heckman 2 Step Estimation, 2nd Step
FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests
Yrs. of Schooling 0.0027 (0.0021 ) 0.0024 (0.0021 ) 0.0027 (0.0021 ) 0.0024 (0.0021 )
Higher Education 0.0115 (0.0088 ) 0.0088 (0.0087 ) 0.0115 (0.0088 ) 0.0089 (0.0087 )
















Parents same Muni. −0.0026 (0.0063 ) 0.1015 (0.0409
∗∗) −0.0027 (0.0062 ) 0.1019 (0.0409
∗∗)










[87 − 01]×Farum −0.0124 (0.0075
∗ ) −0.0120 (0.0075 )
[87 − 97]×Farum −0.0209 (0.0074
∗∗) −0.0206 (0.0074
∗∗)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is 61108.
43Table 8: Heckman 2 Step Estimation, 2nd Step, Continued
FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests
PSH × [A20 ∼ A21] 0.1048 (0.0375
∗∗) 0.1047 (0.0375
∗∗)
PSH × [A22 ∼ A23] 0.1078 (0.0393
∗∗) 0.1073 (0.0393
∗∗)
PSH × [A24 ∼ A25] 0.1422 (0.0407
∗∗) 0.1419 (0.0407
∗∗)
PSH × [A26 ∼ A27] 0.1095 (0.0417
∗∗) 0.1094 (0.0417
∗∗)
PSH × [A28 ∼ A30] 0.1090 (0.0437
∗∗) 0.1088 (0.0437
∗∗)
PSM × [A20 ∼ A21] −0.1193 (0.0417
∗∗) −0.1194 (0.0417
∗∗)
PSM × [A22 ∼ A23] −0.0948 (0.0413
∗∗) −0.0949 (0.0413
∗∗)
PSM × [A24 ∼ A25] −0.1168 (0.0425
∗∗) −0.1172 (0.0425
∗∗)
PSM × [A26 ∼ A27] 0.1080 (0.0421
∗∗) −0.1086 (0.0421
∗∗)
PSM × [A28 ∼ A30] −0.1146 (0.0422
∗∗) −0.1153 (0.0422
∗∗)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is 61108.
44Table 9: OLS for Unemployment Uninsured and Insured Workers
Uninsured Workers Insured Workers
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests





















∗ ) −0.0169 (0.0098




∗ ) 0.0131 (0.0068
∗ ) 0.0063 (0.0042 ) 0.0097 (0.0037
∗∗)
[87 − 01] × Farum −0.0345 (0.0100
∗∗) −0.0009 (0.0053 )
[87 − 97] × Farum −0.0404 (0.0095
∗∗) −0.0078 (0.0052 )
R squares 0.0307 0.0308 0.0192 0.0192
Sample Size 53886 53886 94158 94158
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
45Table 10: Fixed Eﬀects for Unemployment Uninsured and Insured Workers.
Uninsured Workers Insured Workers
FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests
Yrs. of Schooling 0.0039 (0.0025 ) 0.0038 (0.0025 ) −0.0009 (0.0017 ) −0.0009 (0.0017 )
Higher Education 0.0363 (0.0105
∗∗) 0.0362 (0.0105
∗∗) 0.0093 (0.0069 ) 0.0093 (0.0069 )
Married 0.0096 (0.0089 ) 0.0095 (0.0089 ) 0.0024 (0.0030 ) 0.0024 (0.0030 )





∗∗) 0.0020 (0.0058 ) 0.0039 (0.0049 )
[87 − 01] × Farum −0.0447 (0.0142
∗∗) 0.0052 (0.0068 )
[87 − 97] × Farum −0.0509 (0.0151
∗∗) 0.0027 (0.0061 )
Sample Size 53886 53886 94158 94158
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 11: Probit Estimation for Insurance Choice
Probit1 Probit2
Dependent Variable UI UI
Yrs. of Schooling −0.0569 (0.0022∗∗) −0.0569 (0.0022∗∗)
Higher Education 0.8147 (0.0104∗∗) 0.8147 (0.0104∗∗)
Married 0.0407 (0.0115∗∗) 0.0410 (0.0115∗∗)
Children 0.2882 (0.0111∗∗) 0.2886 (0.0111∗∗)
Developed and Danish 0.1453 (0.0142∗∗) 0.1441 (0.0142∗∗)
Farum −0.2656 (0.0155∗∗) −0.2505 (0.0133∗∗)
[87 − 01] × Farum 0.0916 (0.0194∗∗)
[87 − 97] × Farum 0.0856 (0.0187∗∗)
Sample Size 148044 148044
46Table 12: Heckman 2 Step Estimation, 1st Step
Step 1
Dependent Variable Farum
Yrs. of Schooling −0.0286 (0.0073∗∗)
Higher Education 0.0667 (0.0399∗ )
Married 0.1265 (0.0408∗∗)
Children 0.2917 (0.0427∗∗)
Parents outside Farum −0.5138 (0.0379∗∗)
Parents in Farum 0.5112 (0.0425∗∗)
Sample Size 26584
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
47Table 13: Heckman 2 Step Estimation, 2nd Step
FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests
Yrs. of Schooling 0.0024 (0.0041 ) 0.0020 (0.0041 ) 0.0024 (0.0041 ) 0.0020 (0.0041 )
Higher Education 0.0312 (0.0162∗ ) 0.0279 (0.0162∗ ) 0.0311 (0.0162∗ ) 0.0278 (0.0162∗ )
Married 0.0028 (0.0138 ) 0.0031 (0.0137 ) 0.0024 (0.0138 ) 0.0027 (0.0137 )
Children −0.0172 (0.0132 ) −0.0176 (0.0131 ) −0.0174 (0.0132 ) −0.0178 (0.0131 )
Farum 0.4545 (0.1778∗∗) 0.4529 (0.1780∗∗) 0.4600 (0.1772∗∗) 0.4587 (0.1774∗∗)
Parents same Home −0.0336 (0.0146∗∗) −0.1328 (0.0575∗∗) −0.0333 (0.0146∗∗) −0.1323 (0.0574∗∗)
Parents same Muni. 0.0014 (0.0134 ) 0.1062 (0.0591∗ ) 0.0006 (0.0133 ) 0.1060 (0.0591∗ )
Inverse Mill’s Ratio λ1 −0.3376 (0.1422∗∗) −0.3496 (0.1407∗∗) −0.3329 (0.1423∗∗) −0.3442 (0.1407∗∗)
Inverse Mill’s Ratio λ2 0.2206 (0.1032∗∗) 0.2136 (0.1032∗∗) 0.2260 (0.1028∗∗) 0.2194 (0.1028∗∗)
[87 − 01]×Farum −0.0404 (0.0154∗∗) −0.0397 (0.0155∗∗)
[87 − 97]×Farum −0.0546 (0.0163∗∗) −0.0541 (0.0164∗∗)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is 26584.
48Table 14: Heckman 2 Step Estimation, 2nd Step, Continued
FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests
PSH × [A20 ∼ A21] 0.1019 (0.0562
∗ ) 0.1015 (0.0562
∗ )
PSH × [A22 ∼ A23] 0.1161 (0.0627
∗ ) 0.1153 (0.0627
∗ )
PSH × [A24 ∼ A25] 0.1619 (0.0644
∗∗) 0.1615 (0.0643
∗∗)
PSH × [A26 ∼ A27] 0.1188 (0.0667
∗ ) 0.1189 (0.0667
∗ )
PSH × [A28 ∼ A30] 0.0661 (0.0807 ) 0.0654 (0.0807 )
PSM × [A20 ∼ A21] −0.1258 (0.0597
∗∗) −0.1257 (0.0597
∗∗)
PSM × [A22 ∼ A23] −0.1004 (0.0624 ) −0.1006 (0.0624 )
PSM × [A24 ∼ A25] −0.1309 (0.0636
∗∗) −0.1317 (0.0637
∗∗)
PSM × [A26 ∼ A27] −0.1232 (0.0635
∗ ) −0.1241 (0.0635
∗ )
PSM × [A28 ∼ A30] −0.0980 (0.0661 ) −0.0988 (0.0661 )
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is 26584.
Table 15: Fixed Eﬀects for Unemployment Uninsured Workers
25 % 50 % 75 %
FE1 FE2 FE3
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests
> x% [87 − 01] × Farum −0.2255 (0.0853∗∗) −0.3741 (0.1277∗∗) −0.3723 (0.1601∗∗)
[87 − 97] × Farum −0.1776 (0.0778∗∗) −0.2645 (0.1195∗∗) −0.3614 (0.1524∗∗)
Sample Size 11423 8286 5634
≤ x% [87 − 01] × Farum 0.0098 (0.0096 ) 0.0095 (0.0108 ) −0.0067 (0.0122 )
[87 − 97] × Farum −0.0071 (0.0091 ) −0.0082 (0.0102 ) −0.0200 (0.0122∗ )
Sample Size 35685 38822 ﬁll in
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
49Table 16: Robustness Checks, Count Data Results
UI & SA SA UI
Dependent Variable No. of Arrests No. of Arrests No. of Arrests
[87 − 91] × Farum (OLS) −0.2370 (0.1106∗∗)
[92 − 97] × Farum (OLS) −0.3642 (0.1067∗∗)
[98 − 01] × Farum (OLS) 0.0261 (0.1171 )
[87 − 01] × Farum (OLS) −0.2278 (0.0823∗∗) −0.3506 (0.1046∗∗) −0.0246 (0.1268 )
[87 − 97] × Farum (OLS) −0.3101 (0.0862∗∗) −0.4068 (0.1104∗∗) −0.1753 (0.1339 )
[87 − 01] × Farum (FE) −0.1664 (0.0702∗∗) −0.3016 (0.0927∗∗) 0.0954 (0.1254 )
[87 − 97] × Farum (FE) −0.2119 (0.0682∗∗) −0.3528 (0.0911∗∗) 0.0307 (0.1204 )
[87 − 01] × Farum (FE & MV) −0.1924 (0.0755∗∗) −0.3338 (0.1005∗∗) 0.0653 (0.1351 )
[87 − 97] × Farum (FE & MV) −0.2385 (0.0725∗∗) −0.3977 (0.0972∗∗) 0.0109 (0.1283 )
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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 Figure 3: Property Crime Arrest Rate of Unemployment Uninsured Danish Citizens and 
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Figure 4: Violent Crime Arrest Rate of Unemployment Uninsured Danish Citizen and 






















































































































 Figure 5: Property Crime Arrest Rate of Unemployment Insured Danish Citizens and Western 
















































































































12 per. Mov. Avg. (18-19) 12 per. Mov. Avg. (20-24) 12 per. Mov. Avg. (25-29)  
Figure 6: Violence Crime Arrest Rate of Unemployment Insured Danish Citizens and Western 




















































































































































































 Figure 9: Arrest Rates of 




















Figure 10: Property Crime Arrest Rates of 





























 Figure 11: Violent Crime Arrest Rates of 























Figure 12: Arrest Rates























 Figure 13: Property Crime Arrest Rates


























Figure 14: Violent Crime Arrest Rates


























 Figure 15: Ratios of Nonwestern Origin Immigrants of





































Figure 16: Average Years of Schooling of 
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